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INVESTOR PROTECTION, FIRM FUNDAMENTALS 
INFORMATION, AND STOCK PRICE SYNCHRONICITY 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reports a cross-country study on the use of firm fundamentals information (FFI) in 
capital market pricing decisions with institutional arrangements for investor protection (IP) as a 
moderating variable. We use accounting accruals information (AAI) as a proxy for FFI and stock 
price synchronicity (SPS) as a measure of use of FFI and other information in capital market 
pricing decisions.  
Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY) (2000) posit that when the information environment in a capital 
market is more developed, investors use FFI of firms in making investment decisions and this 
lowers SPS. Conversely, when the information environment in a capital market is less developed, 
investors rely more on market information in making investment decisions and this increases SPS.  
Using data from 1995 to 2010 for the 40 countries of MYY, we find that AAI is associated with 
SPS only when IP levels are high, which suggests that investors rely on FFI in making investment 
decisions when IP is stronger.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY) (2000) illustrate that stock prices around the world are not equally 
effective in incorporating firm fundamental information (FFI). In their seminal work on stock price 
synchronicity (SPS), they report that SPS is lower in countries with stronger investor protection 
(IP). Assuming that SPS is a reflection of the use of FFI, they conclude that the use of FFI is lower 
in countries with greater impediments to informed trading due to the countries’ weak legal and 
institutional structures. Kim and Shi (2012) find support for this view. They find that SPS is lower 
for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopters than for non-adopters and that for 
IFRS adopters it decreases from the pre-adoption period to the post-adoption period. They also 
find that the SPS-reducing effect of IFRS adoption is lessened (heightened) for firms with high 
(low) analyst following and is stronger (weaker) for firms in countries with poor (good) 
institutional environments. 
A growing body of research supports these findings internationally while others challenge the 
MYY conclusions. Alves, Peasnell, & Taylor, (2010) and Ashbaugh, Gassen, & La-Fond, (2006) 
investigate the conclusion of MYY that SPS is a measure of the firm-specific information 
capitalized in stock prices in international markets. They show that SPS does not capture FFI. 
Alves et al. (2010) make no direct tests of FFI with SPS. They raise questions about the 
interpretability of R2. Ashbaugh et al. (2006) attempt to show a direct association between FFI and 
SPS, but fail to provide conclusive evidence. One of the reasons for the unsuccessful attempt to 
draw a connection between FFI and SPS could be due to the small number of mostly highly 
developed countries’ data used in the study, and the absence of a focus on a key aspect of 
accounting information, namely accounting accruals information (AAI). Ashbaugh et al. (2006) 
and MYY’s variables are concerned with the current variability of firm performance as a proxy 
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for firm risk. Also, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) do not make allowance for the complementing effects 
of IP in the association between FFI and SPS. Given the small number of similarly developed 
countries in their sample, this aspect could not be tested. 1 
The purpose of this paper is to examine both the direct effects of FFI on SPS and the 
complementing effects of IP on the relation between FFI and SPS. In doing so, first the Ashbaugh 
et al. (2006) FFI measures are used and then a measure representing accounting based accruals is 
used. The tests of this study are akin to MYY’s; however, this study uses a multi-year data set to 
reduce any single year bias that may have affected the MYY results.  
We use several proxies of IP identified from MYY and other prior studies to explain the variation 
in SPS over time. The components of IP we use are Rule of Law (RoL), Government Efficiency 
(GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Control of Corruption (CoC), Political Stability (PS), and Voice 
and Accountability (VA) measures obtained from the World Bank. We also use stock market 
development (SMD) proxied by natural log of the number of companies as other explanatory 
variables.  
Using a sample of MMY’s forty countries with data from 1995 to 2010, we find a significant 
negative relation between IP and SPS. For the association between FFI and SPS, the Ashbaugh et 
al. (2006) FFI measures we use are LOSS, standard deviation of return on assets (STDROA) and 
standard deviation of sales (STDSALES). These FFI capture firm fundamentals that proxy for firm-
level risk. We then use accounting accruals information (AAI) as another measure of FFI. AAI is 
a fundamental accounting construct that captures firm-specific information. For both FFI, we study 
the complementing effects of IP on FFI.  
                                                 
1 Ashbaugh et al. (2006) use Australia, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US as their sample countries. 
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For the Ashbaugh et al. (2006) FFI, we find mostly inconclusive results, as Ashbaugh et al. (2006) 
did. For AAI, we find that on its own AAI does not provide conclusive results, but when 
complemented by IP, AAI has a negative association with SPS. In other words, when the quality 
of IP arrangements is better in a country, investors appreciate the information-enhancing aspect, 
and use AAI for investment decision making. AAI is both relevant and reliable. It is relevant 
because it reflects future economic benefits of a firm (Barth et al., 2008; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995). 
It is reliable when IP arrangements are stronger, as AAI, under higher quality IP, undergoes careful 
processing and greater scrutiny before it is released to the market. Likewise, we conclude that FFI 
is used to assess the fundamentals of firms in investment markets when it provides accruals-based 
information under higher quality IP arrangements. Therefore, we conclude that although FFI is not 
directly related to SPS on a consistent basis, the strong association of SPS with the interaction of 
FFI and IP suggests that investors rely on FFI in making investment decisions in strong IP 
countries.  
The study contributes to both the synchronicity literature the capital markets institutions literature 
and the accounting literature. The study updates the understanding of market synchronicity and 
shows that cross-country variations in synchronicity remain. For the institutional literature, this 
study provides insights into how SPS is related to the firm-specific and country-specific constructs. 
It shows that FFI is dependent on the quality of IP. Therefore, better functioning investment 
markets need to have both better quality FFI and strong IP. To the accounting literature that deals 
with FFI, it adds that investors rely on accruals as a source of FFI. Accruals allows the flexibility 
to managers to better communicate their knowledge of the firm’s economic position in financial 
reports (Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari & Watts, 1998).  
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The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides the literature review. Hypotheses 
development and research method are reported in Section 3. Section 4 reports the results. Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews cross-country studies of SPS and discusses whether SPS is a proxy for FFI 
capitalized in share prices in international markets through investment decisions of investors.  
MMY in their seminal work on SPS find that stock prices around the world are not equally 
effective in incorporating FFI. MYY report that SPS is lower in countries with stronger IP. They 
use some measures of FFI in their study, but find no conclusive results for these measures. 
Assuming that SPS is a reflection of the use of FFI, they conclude that the use of FFI is weaker in 
countries with weaker legal and institutional structures. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2006) specifically study the association of SPS with FFI in six developed equity 
markets and find inconsistent results (negative association for some countries, while positive for 
others). This inconsistency in results leads them to conclude that SPS does not represent FFI 
impounded in share prices across countries. Ashbaugh et al. (2006) also examine whether cross 
listing in the US stock market reduces SPS, but find no support for their hypothesis. They argue 
that differences in institutional arrangements (such as voluntary information flows, ownership 
structures, and trading activity) affect the price formation process in these markets. 
Alves et al. (2010) also examine the quality of the information environment of their sample 
countries. They argue that if SPS is a proxy of the quality of information environment, then the 
spurious aggregation and decomposition should not change the R2 proxy of SPS. Specifically, they 
investigate the statistical characteristics of the R2 measure of SPS. They find that R2 falls 
7 
 
(increases) when they create (decompose) a hypothetical country. These changes in R2, they 
believe, cannot be referenced to the changes in the quality of the information environment, since 
this aggregation/decomposition represents the same quality of information environment. 
Moreover, they rank countries according to their average R2 values and find that their rankings of 
a country’s R2 are different from those reported by MYY for 1995. They also document that the 
annual R2 value changes from year to year. However, their sample selection and R2 computation 
is different from the MYY’s computation. Their sample of companies for each country is less than 
that of MYY’s for 1995 and, unlike MYY, they do not control for the international market effects 
and currency exchange rates. However, both studies (Alves et al., 2010; Ashbaugh et al., 2006) 
conclude that R2 does not represent FFI across countries.  
Others study the information environments of developing countries and argue that markets in 
developing countries with an opaque information environment increase the cost of collecting firm-
specific information. Therefore, analysts in these countries generate their forecasts based on 
macroeconomic or market information (Chan & Hameed, 2006). Likewise, stock prices in these 
countries generate less FFI leading to higher levels of SPS. In a similar study, Jin and Myers (2004) 
find that countries with opaque firms and weak financial systems have higher SPS.2 Their results 
also show that higher crash frequencies are associated with higher R2 values. Notably, these results 
are evident in countries with less developed financial systems and weak IP arrangements.  
Li et al. (2004) find that lower country-level R2 values are associated with greater capital market 
openness. However, this negative relation is contingent upon the strong IP arrangements of the 
countries. Similar results (negative relation) are found by Wang and Yu (2008) in their study of 
                                                 
2Jin and Myers (2004) investigate the relation of firms’ opacity and SPS for 40 countries from 1990-2001. 
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accounting standards and SPS, but only when IP is a moderating variable. To sum up, these studies 
conclude that country-level strong IP arrangements help improve accounting quality, leading 
investors to capitalize FFI in making investment decisions. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2006) conclude that SPS does not reflect FFI capitalized in stock prices. The 
accounting based FFI they use (loss, standard deviation of ROA and standard deviation of sales) 
are measures of the risk associated with firm performance. These variables may have two general 
effects. One aspect of these variables is the information source aspect. If SPS (R2) represents firm-
specific information, then the presence of these variables would provide risk measures for making 
investment decisions, leading to investors relying on these measures as FFI. However, these 
variables have another aspect, the economic aspect. Higher volatility in these variables would 
suggest that the firms are in distress, which could lead the investors to follow the market trend, 
thereby increasing SPS.  
Other variables used by Ashbaugh et al. (2006), such as reporting of R&D, are normally reported 
by large firms. Moreover, although analyst following is associated with a richer information 
environment, it is not an accounting FFI variable. Further, including R&D and analyst following 
will reduce the sample size because only larger firms tend to have these variables. Their sample 
covers only a small number (six) of developed countries.  
In addition, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) do not use the quality of regulatory environment as an 
intervening variable to examine the association between SPS and FFI. The quality of the regulatory 
environment and the quality of accounting standards can lead to a more reliable FFI, which when 
used by the investors are impounded in stock prices resulting in lower SPS. The evidence of IP 
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having an influence on SPS has been provided by MYY. However, MYY do not provide direct 
evidence of the influence of IP on the association between FFI and SPS.  
Another possible reason for the inconsistent results could be the absence of drawing a connection 
between SPS and one of the key FFI accounting accruals information. Accruals provide 
incremental information beyond cash flow. Dechow (1994) reports that accruals are superior to 
cash-based measures as measures of firm performance. Similar arguments are also reported by 
Subramanyam (1996) who finds that accruals are priced by the market. 
Accrual accounting provides information about a firm’s earnings and its components and is a better 
indicator of enterprise performance than cash-based accounting information. It records 
transactions in the period they occur in an attempt to record the financial effects on the firm’s 
economic performance. FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (1978), 
paragraph 44 states: 
“Information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual 
accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise performance than does 
information about current cash receipts and payments.” 
 
Many studies investigate accruals as an information signal about earnings. For example, Dechow 
et al. (1998) and Dechow (1994) find that current earnings better predict future cash flows than 
current cash flows. Defond and Park (1997) find that discretionary accruals convey information 
about future profitability. Sankar and Subramanyam (2002) argue that managers use their 
discretion with appropriate restrictions in communicating private information to the market, thus 
increasing the information content of reported earnings.  
Accrual accounting matches revenue and expense better than cash flow and thus makes accounting 
information more value-relevant. For example, Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2000) argue that 
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sophisticated investors are aware of the implications of accruals and cash flow components of 
earnings and accordingly adjust their estimates of future earnings. Subramanyam (1996) find 
evidence consistent with accruals conveying information about future profitability. Specifically, 
he finds that accruals are positively associated with future operating cash flow, and net income. 
Louis and Robinson (2005) study the effects of stock splits and accruals as a means of signaling 
private information to the market. They find results consistent with their hypothesis that the market 
prices the pre-split accruals at the split announcement. All these studies suggest that the market 
values accruals since it increases the ability of earnings to reflect the fundamental value of the 
firm. 
Other studies examine which accruals component provides more information about earnings (see, 
e.g., Fairfield, Whisenant, &Yohn, 2001; Hribar, 2000; Sloan, 1996; Thomas & Zhang, 2002; Xie, 
2001) and find that inventory accruals and discretionary accruals provide information to the 
market. Additionally, Barth et al. (2001) find that each component of accruals captures different 
information not only about delayed cash flows related to past transactions, but also about expected 
future cash flows related to management's expected future operating and investing activity (Barth 
et al., 2001, p. 28). Further, Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2001) find that the combined 
effects of asset and liability accruals provide more information than the individual components, 
and that non-discretionary accruals, sales growth, provide information about earnings quality.  
Conversely, managers may use accruals to inflate earnings to either mislead investors or to 
expropriate funds. Consistent with this opportunistic view of accruals, Dechow et al. (1998) and 
Beneish (2001) show stock price declines for earnings management companies that are under 
investigation. Teoh, Yang and Zhang (2006) find that firms with income-increasing abnormal 
accruals in the year of an equity offer have subsequent stock underperformance. Sloan (1996) and 
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Xie (2001) show that future abnormal returns are largely negative for firms with a large component 
of accruals in their earnings. Moreover, Healey and Wahlen (1999) argue that firms that manage 
earnings upwards show subsequent stock price declines, whereas firms with downward earnings 
management show positive returns. It is worthwhile noting that the use of accruals depends on the 
IP arrangements of the respective markets. Thus, this study also investigates the association of SPS 
with accruals to ascertain whether accruals provide information to the market, or are an earnings 
manipulation tool. 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1. Hypotheses Development 
MYY and others argue that SPS is a function of firm-specific information. Based on this notion, 
Ashbaugh et al. (2006) posit that if investors rely on FFI rather than market-wide movements in 
making investment decisions, better quality FFI would reduce SPS. However, Ashbaugh et al. 
(2006) report that SPS does not reflect FFI and variation in stock returns occur due to noise or 
factors unrelated to FFI.3 The Ashbaugh et al. (2006) FFI variables only reflect the income 
smoothing and risk measures related to firm’s past performance and do not account for institutional 
arrangements. They use only a small set of countries, which allowed them to conduct only intra-
country tests of association between FFI and SPS. 
Accrual accounting information is often used to provide information to outsiders that reflect a 
firm’s current and future performance (Dechow, 1994). Accrual accounting recognizes the 
expected future financial benefits and obligations accruing to an enterprise over a period. Accrual 
accounting matches revenue and expense better than cash flow accounting and makes accounting 
                                                 
3Such as Shiller (1980) and West (1988). 
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information more value-relevant (Hung, 2000). The investors' demand for and reliance on reliable 
publicly disclosed information may drive insiders to provide information that truly and accurately 
reflect a firm’s economic performance (Healey & Wahlen, 1998). If investors perceive accruals as 
information signals, then this is likely to reduce SPS.  
Theoretically, MYY’s argument that SPS is a function of firm-specific information is logical 
because SPS is based on firm specific returns. Therefore, regardless of the proxy of SPS (Ashbaugh 
or accruals), we hypothesize:   
H1: There is a negative association between FFI and SPS. 
However, managers can use accrual accounting opportunistically to manage earnings. Insiders and 
controlling owners may have incentives to manage earnings either to mask firm performance 
and/or to hide their private control benefits from outsiders (Leuz et al., 2003). They do so by using 
their financial reporting discretion. In essence, insiders, in order to avoid outsiders’ intervention, 
manage the level and variability of reported earnings. If investors perceive accruals to be an 
earnings management tool then higher accruals will increase SPS.  
MYY argue that countries differ in the use of FFI because of different levels of IP across countries. 
They contend that the incorporation of FFI depends on the IP arrangements of the respective capital 
markets. For an efficient capital market not only FFI is important but also IP is a fundamental 
factor for reducing information asymmetry, and adequately capitalizing FFI in share price returns. 
Legal rules and their strict enforcement effectively protect outside investors (Leuz et al., 2003). 
MYY also argue that the level of IP arrangements regulates the quality of firm-specific information 
reported to outsiders. Thus, a strong IP system is likely to increase the use of FFI in capital markets 
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and reduce SPS. We expect IP to have a complementing influence, with the strength of IP 
arrangements enhancing the effects of FFI. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: The negative association between FFI and SPS is enhanced by IP. 
3.2. Research Method 
3.2.1 Sample 
We sample the same 40 countries of MYY from 1995-2010. For computing SPS measures, we 
collect weekly share prices, the local market index, the US market index, and the currency 
exchange rates from DataStream International (DSI) for the sample countries over the sample 
period. For South Korea, the currency exchange rate against US$ is not available prior to 2006 on 
DSI. Therefore the exchange rates for South Korea for 1995-2005 are from OANDA.4 The initial 
sample consisted of all firm-year observations taken from DSI with a total of 1,241,662 firm-year 
observations for all 40 countries (Table 1, column 2). For each country, we download share price 
data for active, dead, and suspended companies for each year. A company is included in the sample 
if it trades for at least 30 weeks of the year on the stock exchange. We calculate share price returns 
on biweekly basis for each company for each year for the sample period. Like MYY, we find that 
the computed biweekly returns contain outliers. If these are coding errors in share prices, this may 
bias results or add noise to data (MYY). Therefore, we exclude the observations for which the 
stock returns exceeds 0.25 in absolute value. Next, we compute SPS measures (Com and R2) for 
each year for the sample countries. To be consistent across the sample period, we match the 
observations of companies across the sample period. After matching the companies on a yearly 
                                                 
4http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ 
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basis for the sample period, the sample reduces to 656,538 firm-year observations countries (Table 
1, column 3).  
We download IP variables from the World Bank website. The number of companies of each 
country is from DSI. We download firm fundamentals variables of net income, sales, total assets, 
market value of equity (share price multiplied by the number of share outstanding) and cash flow 
from operations from DSI. We use Ashbaugh et al’s (2006) Loss, STDROA, and STDSALES as the 
first set of FFI variables. STDROA and STDSALES are computed on a five years rolling basis. 
Thus, we lose the first four years data (1995-1998) and the sample starts from 1999.  We use AAI 
as the second proxy for FFI. To control for firm size, we scale both STDSALES and AAI by total 
assets. We match companies on the basis of FFI and both SPS measures (Com and R2) for each 
year for the sample countries.5 After matching the countries, the observations are reduced to 
209,260 firm-year observations for the sample countries (Table 1, column 4).6 
                                                 
5There are differences in the number of companies (number of observations) for each year in each country; e.g., for 
one year, DSI returns data for 100 companies for FFIs while the SPS measures are available for 150 companies. Thus, 
in order to be consistent in the analyses, I match up companies on the bases of SPS measures and FFIs, which further 
reduces the sample. 
6Alves et al. (2010) report that investigating the UK data for such extreme returns reveal that these are not 
measurement error and are likely to provide important new information about a firm. However, including these high 
return observations in the analysis does not change the results. 
[Type text] 
 
15 
 
 
Table 1 No. of Firm-year Observations for the Analyses 
Column 2, displays the number of firm-year observations for share price data for each country; Column 3 reports 
number of firm-year observations for computing SPS measures after dropping firms with less than 30 weeks trading 
on the stock exchange. The last Column displays firm-year observations for regression analyses after matching each 
company’s FFI and SPS with returns less than |25%|. 
1 2 3 4 
Country 
TOTAL AVAILABLE 
OBSERVATIONS 
Number of total firm-
year observations with 
share price 
OBSERVATIONS WITH SPS  
Number of firm-year 
observations for computing SPS 
measures with more than 30 
weeks trading on stock exchange 
SAMPLE FOR FFI AND SPS 
STAGE 
Number of matched firm-year 
observations for regression models 
for companies with return < |25%| 
US 470,116 221,948 45,773 
Japan 66,174 57,876 34,383 
Hong Kong 17,022 14,640 15,373 
China 19,929 19,368 12,728 
UK 112,075 38,309 10,763 
Taiwan 13,130 13,128 9,264 
Malaysia 14,620 12,943 7,313 
Germany 12,643 12,453 6,812 
Australia 41,716 23,556 6,019 
India 39,908 26,074 5,679 
Canada 159,039 62,370 4,891 
Singapore 12,937 8,872 4,507 
Thailand 15,945 8,666 4,191 
France 34,772 17,717 4,120 
Greece 7,388 5,212 3,042 
Italy 10,276 5,512 2,799 
Indonesia 6,706 4,869 2,779 
Brazil 16,754 8,546 2,488 
South Africa 4,713 4,349 2,469 
Sweden 19,516 7,171 2,453 
South Korea 31,284 24,379 2,253 
Turkey 5,651 4,600 2,032 
Poland 5,059 3,589 1,743 
Norway 8,072 3,604 1,668 
Philippines 5,202 3,779 1,582 
Finland 4,225 2,427 1,407 
Spain 5,152 3,276 1,323 
Chile 5,264 3,161 1,309 
Denmark 6,778 3,840 1,266 
Pakistan 6,556 4,552 1,061 
Holland 10,870 4,116 1,039 
Belgium 11,806 5,282 947 
New Zealand 5,943 2,772 909 
Austria 4,510 2,390 805 
Mexico 8,885 2,969 764 
Portugal 4,115 1,609 423 
Ireland 2,697 1,119 338 
Czech Rep 5,085 1,841 269 
Colombia 3,401 1,096 244 
Peru 5,728 2,558 32 
Total 1,241,662 656,538 209,260 
[Type text] 
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 3.2.2 Research Design 
We investigate the association of SPS with FFI. We use two distinct proxies of FFI. The first set 
of FFI is from Ashbaugh et al. (2006) and the second set is AAI.  
For H1 we conduct an investigation of the association of SPS with FFI at the country-level. For 
this purpose, the following model is proposed: 
SPSjt = α0+α1FFIjt+α2IPjt+α3SMDjt +α4YEARt+ε  (1) 
Where Com, R2 and SYNCH are the three SPS measures for country j at times t; FFI represents two 
distinct proxies of FFI; one set drawn from Ashbaugh et al. (2006), i.e., LOSS is equal to one if net 
income is negative and zero otherwise; STDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets 
calculated over a five year rolling basis; STDSALES is the standard deviation of sales scaled by 
total assets and is calculated on a five-year rolling basis. The second proxy for FFI is AAI (accrual 
accounting information) and is the standardized value of total accruals computed as operating 
income less cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets. As a country-level measure of AAI, 
we take the median value across all the firms scaled by its standard deviation to control for 
variation in the market; IP is investor protection and is the first principal component of the World 
Bank Governance Indicators; and SMD is stock market development proxied by the natural log of 
the number of companies. The variables SMD and YEAR are control variables. For the country-
level analyses, we take the median value across all firms to represent a country-level observation 
for each year in each country. SYNCH is the first principal component of Com and R2. If IP helps 
in the informed arbitrage across countries (MYY), then we expect negative coefficients for IP. 
[Type text] 
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For H2, we examine the association between SPS and both sets of FFI with the interaction of IP. 
The following model is estimated: 
SPS = α0+α1FFIjt+α2IPjt + α2FFI*IPjt +α6SMDjt+YEARt+ε  (2) 
where FFI*IPjt represents the interaction of IP with respective FFI variables of loss, standard 
deviation of ROA, standard deviation of sales, and accruals (IP*LOSS, IP*STDROA, 
IP*STDSALES, and AAI*IP, respectively) in country j at times t. 
Prior research uses LOSS as a news event which is reflected in returns (see, e.g., Hayn, 1995; Joos 
& Plesko, 2005). Both STDROA and STDSALES are included in the model for capturing the 
volatility of the firm fundamentals (Leuz et al., 2003; Wei & Zhang, 2006). Both measures have 
an effect on returns, which in turn affects SPS. Moreover, volatility of ROA and sales are included 
in the model due to differences in income smoothing and the potential influence of income 
smoothing on return-on-assets (Ashbaugh et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). If firms smooth income, 
then the volatility of ROA and sales is likely to be low. This would be perceived in the market as 
lower quality accounting information and would result in high SPS. 
3.2.3 Computation of Variables 
MYY uses two measures for SPS, Com and R2. First, we report computation of these SPS measures 
(Com, R2). Next, we propose another measure, a principal component of Com and R2. This is 
followed by the definitions of the explanatory and control variables of the study.  
[Type text] 
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3.2.3.1  Co-movement 
The first SPS measure is called co-movement (Com). This measure captures the tendency of 
company stock prices to move in the same direction (Khandaker & Heaney, 2008). It is the ratio 
of co-directional change at a particular period of time: 
[ ]
∑ += t downjtupjt
down
jt
up
jt
j nn
nn
T
f
,max1    (a) 
where upjtn  is the number of stocks in country j whose prices rise in period t, while 
down
jtn  is the 
number of stocks whose prices fall, and T is the number of total periods. The value of Com must 
lie between 0.5 and 1.0 where 1 means 100% share price movement while 0.5 shows that 50% of 
the stocks prices move in the same direction in a particular period. 
3.2.3.2  Market Model R2 
MYY use a modified version of the market model proposed by French and Roll (1986) and Roll 
(1988) to estimate the relative amount of firm-specific information in stock prices. The simple 
explanation of this model is that after removing the return effects due to market-wide systematic 
factors, the remaining return volatility is due to firm-specific events. A low R2 (coefficient of 
determination) from such estimation is possibly due to firms’ returns capturing unique firm-
specific information. Following MYY, we use the same R2 model as a second measure of SPS. 
This measure is as an alternative way of distinguishing firm-specific stock price movements from 
market-wide price movements: 
rit =αi + α1rmjt + α2[rUSt +ejt ] + ε   (b) 
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where i is the firm, j is the country, t a two week time period, rmt is the domestic market index, and 
rUS is the US market return. The rate of change in the exchange rate per US dollar is ejt. When 
calculating this model for the US, α2 equals zero. The R2 coefficient of determination for Equation 
(b) measures the percent of variation in the biweekly returns of stock we in a country j, explained 
by variations in country j’s market return and the US market return. Given this statistic for each 
firm we in country j, we replicate MYY’s measure of R2 which is defined as: 
∑
∑ ×
=
i
ij
i
ijij
j SST
SSTR
R
2
2
    (c) 
as the second SPS measure, where SSTij is the sum of squared total variations. Eq. (b) captures the 
SPS at firm level which is then averaged across all firms in the country sample to calculate a 
country-level measure. The R2 measures the correlation of a firm’s stock returns with the market 
return for a specific time period. Lower (higher) R2 values represent low (high) level of SPS. 
3.2.3.3  SYNCH 
The SPS measures proposed by MYY, Com and R2, are highly correlated (p-value < 0.01). 
Moreover, the market model measure of SPS (R2) is a noisy measure as share prices are affected 
by many other exogenous variables. To combine the similar underlying properties of both SPS in 
one measure and to control for noise in R2, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to extract 
a factor from the two SPS measures.7  
                                                 
7The principal component analysis (PCA) transforms a number of correlated variables into a number of uncorrelated 
variables called principal components (PC). 
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3.2.3.4  Explanatory Variables 
IP is drawn from the World Bank Governance Indicators. IP represents the investor protection 
variables of Rule of Law (RoL), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Voice and Accountability (V&A), 
Control of Corruption (CoC), Government Efficiency (GE), and Political Stability (PS) obtained 
from the World Bank’s Governance indicators. These World Bank governance indicators are 
constructed using the unobserved components methodology, a statistical methodology for 
constructing weighted averages from a data set, with weights reflecting the precision of the 
individual data sources (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). Higher values correspond to better 
governance outcomes. These are survey responses from a large number of enterprises, citizens, 
experts, survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international 
organizations (Kaufmann et al., 2009). These are the only variables available on a time-series 
basis.8 Definitions of the constituent variables of IP are: 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – measures the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) – measures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – measures the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 
                                                 
8 The World Bank governance indicators for the earlier years of 1995, 1997 and 1999 are not available as for the 
earlier years these indicators are computed on an alternate year basis. For the missing years we use mean values 
computed from the available observations. 
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4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL) – measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC) – measures the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. 
The above IP variables range from -2.5 to 2.5 where high scores represent an efficient governance 
system. These variables are positively and significantly correlated with each other (correlation 
ranges from 74% to 98% for all years) with a p-value ≤ 0.001 (not reported) in all cases. Moreover, 
Kaufman et al. (2009, p.5) report that these governance indicators should not be thought of as 
being independent of one another. Therefore, to remove multicollinearity, we use PCA of these 
variables to obtain a factor. we use this factor, termed IP, as the investor protection variable for 
the sample period. 
We use two sets of FF variables. The first set of FFI is from the previous literature (Ashbaugh et 
al., 2006), which are loss (LOSS), standard deviation of ROA (STDROA), and standard deviation 
of sales (STDSALES) as the first set of FFI. LOSS is a dummy variable of 1 if the company reports 
a loss, otherwise 0; standard deviation of ROA and standard deviation of sales are the five-year 
rolling standard deviation of return on assets and sales. The second set of FFI variables has only 
one variable, i.e., accruals. we use standardized accruals (AAI) computed as net income less cash 
flow from operations. To control for firm size, the total accruals are scaled by total assets. 
Moreover, to control for variation across the market, this scaled accruals value is then divided by 
its standard deviation to compute a country-level proxy for each year.  
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3.2.3.5  Control Variables 
The control variables are SMD and YEAR. Year fixed effect controls for macro-economic and 
regulatory changes across years.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. The mean 
and median for Com is the same (0.65) with a small standard deviation (0.05). However, the mean 
and median for R2 is different (0.18 and 0.16, respectively). The mean for SYNCH is 0.00 while 
median is -0.23. The skewness and kurtosis of the SPS measures reveal that these variables are 
normally distributed. The skewness and kurtosis of SMD show that it is not normally distributed. 
The reason for this is stock market development is proxied by the number of companies, which 
has a high variation among the sample countries. The skewness and kurtosis of the FFI variables 
STDROA and STDSALES, and AAI indicate that these variables are normally distributed. LOSS, a 
dichotomous variable, need not be normally distributed for our analyses. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and the Independent Variables 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. Com, R2 and SYNCH are the three SPS measures;LOSS is a dummy variable of 
1 if the company reports aloss, otherwise 0; STDROA and STDSALES are the five-year rolling standard deviation of 
Return on Assets and Sales; AAI is proxied by total accruals computed as net income less cashflow from operations 
scaled by total assets; IP is investor protection and is the first principal component of the World Bank Governance 
Indicators; SMD is stock market development and is represented by the natural log of the number of companies. 
Variable Mean Median StDev Min Max Skew Kurt 
Com 0.58 0.58 0.03 0.50 0.74 0.83 0.90 
R2 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.56 1.20 1.95 
SYNCH 0.00 -0.21 1.22 -2.23 4.21 0.99 1.25 
LOSS 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 12.56 156.31 
STDROA 3.29 3.06 1.58 0.18 8.21 0.76 0.19 
STDSALES 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.49 0.46 
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AAI -0.14 -0.13 0.11 -0.44 0.28 -0.12 0.27 
IP 0.00 0.79 2.32 -5.57 2.89 -0.59 -0.91 
SMD 2142 633 5402 157 40788 5.17 28.75 
LnSMD 6.71 6.45 1.11 5.05 10.61 1.29 1.60 
 
4.2 Bivariate Correlations of SPS and the Explanatory Variables 
Table 3 reports bivariate correlations of the dependent and the independent variables. As expected, 
all SPS measures are highly correlated (0.81) and the correlations are statistically significant (p-
value ≤ 0.01). This suggests that SPS measures proposed by MYY (Com and R2) both represent a 
similar underlying construct. The STDROA is negatively associated with all SPS measures (p-
values are 0.018, 0.005 and 0.000, respectively for Com, R2 and SYNCH). Similarly standard 
deviation of STDSALES is also negatively associated with all SPS measures. This association is 
significant for R2 and SYNCH with p-values of 0.086 and 0.009, respectively.9 These results 
suggest that the FFI variables represent an information signal to the market, which investors 
consider for their investment decisions. 
These results suggest that SPS reflects firm fundamentals being incorporated into share prices. 
STDROA is positively correlated with STDSALES and AAI and this correlation is statistically 
significant (p-values ≤0.01). One of the reasons could be that both sales and accruals are scaled by 
total assets to control for firm size. Another reason could be that sales are directly related to 
income. LOSS is negatively related to all SPS measures but its results are not significant.  
                                                 
9 VIF values are calculated for all regression models and the highest value noted is 2.35. 
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Table 3 Correlations for the Dependent and the Independent Variables 
Table 3reports correlation coefficients for the pooled cross-sectional data.Com, R2 and SYNCH are the three SPS 
measures; LOSS is a dummy variable of 1 if the company reportsa loss, otherwise 0; STDROA and STDSALESare the 
five-year rolling standard deviation of ROA and standard deviation of sales for each company; AAI is proxied by total 
accruals computed as net income less cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; IP is investor protection and is 
the first principal component of the World Bank Governance Indicators; SMD is stock market development and is 
represented by number of companies. The first row represents correlation coefficients while the second row 
representsthe respective probability values. 
 Com R
2 SYNCH LOSS STDROA STDSALES AAI IP 
R2 0.81        
 0.000 
       
SYNCH 0.90 0.88       
 0.000 0.000 
      
LOSS -0.02 -0.04 -0.03      
 0.539 0.302 0.411 
     
STDROA -0.10 -0.12 -0.17 0.19     
 0.018 0.005 0.000 0.000 
    
STDSALES -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.67    
 0.161 0.086 0.009 0.546 0.000 
   
AAI -0.006 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.24 0.32   
 0.896 0.562 0.250 0.705 0.000 0.000 
  
IP -0.43 -0.36 -0.44 -0.01 0.12 0.20 0.12  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.914 0.005 0.000 0.010 
 
SMD -0.19 -0.19 -0.23 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.15 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 FFI from Prior Literature and SPS 
We estimate Model 1 and Model 2 to examine the association of SPS with FFI from earlier 
literature. This analysis is conducted at country-level using pooled cross-sectional data. Table 4 
reports the results. Panel A is for Model 1 while panel B is for Model 2. Model 2 provides results 
for SPS measures with FFI and their interaction with IP variables. In panel A, only STDROA is 
negatively associated with all SPS measures. This negative association is statistically significant 
with p-values of 0.092 for Com, 0.020 for R2 and 0.003 for SYNCH. These results suggest that 
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investor value FFI, specifically ROA, while making investment decisions.LOSS is negatively 
associated with SPS measures of R2 and SYNCH but this association is not significant. The 
STDSALES is positively associated with all SPS measures but is statistically significant for Com 
and SYNCH. This positive association could be due to the positive and significant correlation 
between STDROA and STDSALES. 
These results suggest that investors view firms’ performance as an important FFIin making 
investment decisions. Investors consider the volatility of firm’s performance an important 
information signal; as Ashbaugh et al. (2006) report these variables are an information signal to 
the market. They report that if SPS reflects FFI, then there should be a negative association of 
these FFI variables and SPS since volatility of FFI represents risk and making informed arbitrage 
difficult. Additionally, IP is negatively associated with all SPS measures, and is highly statistically 
significant. SMD is also negatively associated with all SPS measures but is not statistically 
significant. The IP results are consistent with earlier results that strong property rights reduce SPS 
at country-level. Summing up, the negative association of LOSS and STDROA indicate that market 
participants price firm fundamentals. However, the inconsistent results of FFI with SPS make it 
difficult to reach a clear conclusion.  
Table 4 Relation of SPS with FFI 
Panel A reports results for Model 1 while Panel B is for Model 2 for Com, R2 and SYNCH, respectively. LOSS is a 
dummy variable of 1 if the company reports a loss, otherwise 0; STDROA and STDSALES are the five-year rolling 
standard deviations of ROA and sales. IP is the investor protection variable and is the first principal component of the 
World Bank Governance Indicators. SMD is stock market development and is proxied by the natural log of the number 
of companies. The IP*LOSS, IP*STDROA, IP*STDSALES are the interactions of LOSS, STDROA and STDSALES 
with IP variable, respectively. The independent variables are the medians of all the companies in a country 
representing one observation for each country each year. F-stat is the F-statistic and Adj-R2 represents the explanatory 
power of the regression model. The first row reports coefficients of the variables while the second value in italics is 
the respective p-value of the coefficient. 
Variable Panel A Model 1 Panel B Model 2 
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Com R2 SYNCH Com R2 SYNCH 
Intercept 0.652 
0.000 
0.214 
0.000 
0.533 
0.119 
0.652 
0.000 
0.217 
0.000 
0.573 
0.098 
LOSS 0.005 
0.857 
-0.005 
0.901 
-0.065 
0.929 
0.001 
0.975 
-0.013 
0.771 
-0.227 
0.757 
STDROA -0.003 
0.045 
-0.006 
0.020 
-0.150 
0.003 
-0.003 
0.091 
-0.005 
0.066 
-0.131 
0.012 
STDSALES 0.126 
0.092 
0.161 
0.212 
4.04 
0.065 
0.096 
0.219 
0.089 
0.507 
2.872 
0.209 
IP -0.008 
0.000 
-0.012 
0.000 
-0.252 
0.000 
-0.004 
0.082 
-0.004 
0.247 
-0.099 
0.172 
SMD -0.001 
0.412 
-0.004 
0.148 
-0.056 
0.255 
-0.001 
0.507 
-0.004 
0.182 
-0.045 
0.374 
IP*LOSS    -0.006 
0.434 
-0.011 
0.462 
-0.185 
0.467 
IP*STDROA    -0.000 
0.507 
0.000 
0.886 
-0.008 
0.662 
IP*STDSALES    -0.031 
0.340 
-0.087 
0.120 
-1.322 
0.167 
Year Controlled 
F-Stat 10.42*** 11.42*** 8.08*** 9.06*** 9.87*** 7.16*** 
Adj-R2 24.00% 25.9% 19.20% 24.30% 26.1% 19.70% 
 
Next we estimate Model 2 to test hypothesis 2. This model investigates the association of FFI and 
the interaction of IP variables and FFI conjecturing that investors rely more on FFI in countries 
with good IP practices.  
Panel B reports results of the interaction model. In panel B, STDROA again shows statistically 
significant negative association with all SPS measures (p-value ≤0.10 for Com and R2; p-value ≤ 
0.05 for SYNCH). All the interaction variables are in the expected negative direction except in one 
case where the interaction of STDROAand IP shows a positive relation with R2. Overall, the 
negative association of the interaction term (IP*FFI) indicates that investors in countries with 
strong IP tend to price FFI in making investment decisions. Summing up, the reported negative 
associations in most cases, though statistically not significant, suggest that investors rely on FFI 
more in countries with strong property rights arrangements. These results also suggest that IPis a 
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strong determinant in reducing SPS in countries. Moreover, the coefficients on the year dummies 
are mostly negative and not significant. However, the result for the year 2008 (GFC) is positive 
and significant, showing that investors do not rely on FFI and IP in financial crisis years. This 
result is consistent with the results of earlier literature which reports that SPS increases during 
financial crises years (Li et al., 2003). 
4.3.2 SPS and Accruals 
We also run the same models (Model 1 & Model 2) for AAI using pooled cross-sectional data. 
Table 5 reports the results. As pointed out earlier in the sample section, due to the computation of 
the first set of FFI proxy, the sample period is reduced to 1999-2010. In order to compare the 
results for both sets of FFI, we drop the earlier years (1995-1998) from the regression analysis of 
SPS with AAI. Panel A (Model 1) of the table shows that AAI is positively associated with all SPS 
measures, but this association is not statistically significant. Therefore, a conclusion cannot be 
drawn about whether accruals are perceived as an FFI or as an earnings management tool in a 
capital market.   
On the other hand, IP shows a negative and statistically significant association with all SPS 
measures (p-value ≤ 0.01), confirming earlier results. SMD is also negatively associated with R2 
(p-value ≤ 0.05) and SYNCH (p-value ≤ 0.05) but not with Com. However, important here is Model 
2, that investigates the interaction of AAI and IP. The inclusion of the interaction term in the 
regression models tests the effect of AAI for countries with different levels of IP.  
Table 5, Panels B and C report results of Model 2. Panel B shows a negative association of SPS 
with AAI but this association is not significant. Moreover, the associations of all three SPS 
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measures with IP and AAI*IP are negative and statistically significant (p-value ≤ 0.05 for both IP 
and the interaction of IP and AAI). These results indicate that investors value accruals as 
information signals in countries with strong IP arrangements. 
Panel C includes SMD as an additional explanatory variable. The results do not change for AAI. In 
addition to this, IP (p-values of 0.000 with all SPS measures) and the interaction of AAI with IP 
(p-values of 0.021 with Com and 0.000 with R2 and SYNCH) show a strong negative and 
statistically significant relation with all SPS measures. The interaction results suggest that accruals 
are considered as information signals by the market in countries with strong IP arrangements. In 
addition to this, the IP results indicate that countries with strong IP reduce SPS, which is consistent 
with the extant literature and earlier results of this study. To sum up, accruals are considered as 
important information signals by markets in countries with strong IP arrangements. These results 
suggest that the market values accruals since it allows earnings to reflect firm fundamentals (Ali 
et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1998). 
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Table 5 Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Results of SPS with AAI, IP, SMD and AAI*IP (To comparable to Ashbaugh et al (2006) 
results only 1999-2010 data are used) 
Panel A is for Model 1 while Panels B and C are for Model 2. Com, R2 and SYNCH are the three SPS measures. AAI is proxied by total accruals computed 
as net income less cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; IP is the investor protection variable and is the first principal component of the World 
Bank Governance Indicators; SMD is stock market development proxied by the natural log of the number of companies in each country; AAI*IP is the 
interactions of AAI and IP; Year is a control variable; F-stat is the F-statistic and AdjR2 is the explanatory power of the regression model. The first row 
reports coefficients of the variables while the second value in italics is the respective p-values. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables 
Panel A   Panel B     Panel C 
Com R2 SYNCH Com R2 SYNCH Com R2 SYNCH 
Intercept 0.655 0.000 
0.222 
0.000 
0.710 
0.072 
0.642 
0.000 
0.175 
0.000 
-0.018 
0.926 
0.649 
0.000 
0.205 
0.000 
0.442 
0.264 
AAI 0.005 0.780 
0.026 
0.447 
0.488 
0.413 
-0.012 
0.507 
-0.035 
0.275 
-0.456 
0.409 
-0.006 
0.744 
-0.012 
0.730 
-0.103 
0.865 
IP -0.008 0.000 
-0.012 
0.000 
-0.253 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.000 
-0.021 
0.000 
-0.381 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.000 
-0.020 
0.000 
-0.370 
0.000 
SMD -0.001 0.264 
-0.006 
0.019 
-0.105 
0.034    
-0.001 
0.520 
-0.004 
0.131 
-0.067 
0.174 
AAI*IP 
   -0.019 
0.013 
-0.061 
0.000 
-0.930 
0.000 
-0.018 
0.021 
-0.057 
0.000 
-0.868 
0.000 
Year Controlled 
F-Statistic 11.57 12.65 8.46 12.04 14.18 9.56 12.34 13.42 9.06 
AdjR2 23.60% 25.40% 17.91% 24.40% 27.81% 20.01% 25.22% 28.01% 20.16% 
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As a sensitivity test, we estimate the same model using full period pooled cross-sectional data 
(1995-2010) for SPS and AAI to ascertain if the results change. Results do change and are 
presented in Table 6. In Panel A, the association of AAI with R2 becomes negative but the 
significance level does not change. Here the results are also inconclusive with respect to the 
use of AAI. The results for SMD with Com become negative and statistically significant (p-
value of 0.05). For Panel B, the negative association of AAI becomes significant for R2 (p-
value of 0.056) and SYNCH (p-value of 0.09), suggesting that AAI is considered as FFI by the 
market participants. Moreover, the negative relation of Com with the interaction of AAI and 
IP gets stronger with a p-value ≤ 0.001 against the earlier results of p-value ≤ 0.013 (Table 5). 
Similarly, in Panel C, the results for the interaction of AAI and IP (p-value ≤ 0.001) and for 
SMD with a p-value ≤ 0.050 become highly statistically significant. These results change with 
the increase in the number of observation, which is a statistical property of the regression 
model. 
To sum up, accruals is considered as important information signals by markets in countries 
with strong IP arrangements. All these results suggest that the market values accruals since it 
increases the ability of earnings to reflect the fundamentals of the firm (Ali et al., 2000; 
Dechow et al., 1998). 
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Table 6 Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression Results of SPS with AAI, IP, SMD and AAI*IP10 
Panel A is for Model 1 while Panels B and C are for Model 2. Com, R2 and SYNCH are the three SPS measures. AAI is proxied by total accruals computed 
as net income less cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; IP is the investor protection variable and is the first principal component of the World 
Bank Governance Indicators; SMD is stock market development proxied by the natural log of the number of companies in each country; AAI*IP is the 
interaction of AAI and IP; Year is a control variable; F-stat is the F-statistic and AdjR2 is the explanatory power of the regression model. The first row 
reports coefficients of the variables while the second value is the respective p-value given in italics. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables 
Panel A   Panel B     Panel C 
Com R2 SYNCH Com R2 SYNCH Com R2 SYNCH 
Intercept 0.663 0.000 
0.231 
0.000 
0.796 
0.010 
0.643 
0.000 
0.177 
0.000 
0.013 
0.942 
0.662 
0.000 
0.228 
0.000 
0.762 
0.013 
AAI 0.000 0.839 
-0.000 
0.883 
0.003 
0.941 
-0.002 
0.108 
-0.005 
0.056 
-0.085 
0.088 
-0.003 
0.134 
-0.005 
0.080 
-0.077 
0.119 
IP -0.008 0.000 
-0.012 
0.000 
-0.246 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.000 
-0.017 
0.000 
-0.320 
0.000 
-0.011 
0.000 
-0.016 
0.000 
-0.310 
0.000 
SMD -0.003 0.018 
-0.008 
0.000 
-0.013 
0.000    
-0.003 
0.030 
-0.008 
0.000 
-0.122 
0.002 
AAI*IP 
   -0.018 
0.000 
-0.031 
0.000 
-0.513 
0.000 
-0.018 
0.000 
-0.030 
0.000 
-0.491 
0.000 
Year Controlled 
F-Statistic 11.97 12.54 9.08 12.69 12.67 9.35 12.34 12.81 9.48 
AdjR2 23.61% 24.53% 18.54% 24.77% 24.74% 19.04% 25.22% 26.00% 20.14% 
                                                 
10 These results are presented using the full sample period data (1995-2010) in comparison to the earlier Table 5 which uses data from 1999-2010. Table 5 
provides results of pooled cross-sectional data in order to compare the results of both proxies of FFI (Variables used from Ashbaugh et al., 2006 as the first 
proxy and accrual accounting information (AAI) as the second proxy of FFI. 
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Furthermore, the results for 2008 (GFC year) (not tabulated) are positive and statistically 
significant and are also consistent with the earlier results for the first proxy of FFI (variables 
taken from Ashbaugh et al., 2006). These results suggest that investors do not use FFI and IP 
in years of financial distress. These results also suggest further analysis into the effects of 
year-wise use of FFI and the complementing effects of IP.  
To sum up, these results suggest that though investors do not directly capitalize FFI in 
investment decisions but strong IP arrangements facilitate the use of FFI in capital markets. 
Thus investors perceive FFI as information signals in countries with strong IP. These results 
suggest that strong IP determines the quality of financial information reported to outsiders, 
which they capitalize in stock prices in capital markets. Moreover, these results are in line 
with earlier literature which reports that a country’s legal and institutional factors explain 
differences in price-earnings relation across countries (such as, Ali & Hwang, 2000; Ball et 
al., 2000; Hung, 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). Importantly, these results also require caution when 
evaluating due to the positive association (such as for 2005 for Com, R2, and SYNCH) of FFI 
with SPS and the use of AAI as a tool of earnings management. 
4.3.3 SPS and Accruals – Additional Analysis: 
We conduct a further confirmatory analysis to assess how much IP and AAI are associated 
with SPS. We cluster our sample on the basis of annual SYNCH of each country using the K-
Means clustering technique. We identify four distinct clusters (Figure 1, Panel A), with 
Cluster 1 having the lowest SYNCH across all years and Cluster 3 having the highest SYNCH 
across all years, and the other two cluster falling in between the two.  
 
 
 
33 
 
Further analysis of these clusters reveals that IP is the strongest determinant of these clusters 
(Panel B). Cluster 1 countries had the highest IP across all years and Cluster 3 had the lowest 
IP across most years, with the other two clusters falling in between with quite varying IPs 
across the sample years.  
Cluster 1 also had the steadiest AAI and its year-by-year trend was closest to 0, suggesting that 
the countries in this cluster enjoyed smooth AAIs and did not have excessive AAIs (Panel C). 
In other words, their operating income was a good representation of cash based returns. 
Cluster 4, which had the second highest IP, also had smooth AAI but a bit further away from 
0 than Cluster 1 AAI. Also, Cluster 4 had the second lowest SYNCH behind Cluster 1. Both 
clusters 2 and 3, the higher SYNCH clusters, had fluctuating AAIs.  
Finally, in Panel D of Figure 1 we chart the trends of the four clusters with regards to the 
interaction between AAI and IP. We find that the AAI trend for Cluster 1 improves due to the 
intervening effects of IP. This trend line is smooth and closely situated around 0. In other 
words, for the lowest SYNCH countries, the AAI are further improved due to better IP quality, 
which in turn results in more informed stock markets.  
This visual analysis further illustrates that quality IP is important. However, IP and accounting 
based FFI together can make the corporate information setting even better. 
  
 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 1 Cluster Analysis 
 
Panel A Cluster by SYNCH 
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Panel C Mean AAI of each cluster across years 
 
Panel D Mean AAI*IP (Interaction) of each cluster across years 
Clusters: 
Cluster 1: Australia, Canada, France, US, Belgium, Germany, UK, New Zealand, South Africa, Austria 
Cluster 2: Italy, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Colombia, Spain, Greece 
Cluster 3: China 
Cluster 4: Denmark, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Peru, Chile, Norway, Sweden, South Korea\, Poland, Portugal, 
Brazil , Japan, Philippines, Finland, Holland , India, Mexico, Pakistan 
Note:  Ireland, Czech Republic, Turkey and Thailand had no significant membership in any cluster.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically provide evidence on the use of FFI under varying 
IP environments across a range of countries with high and low IP. The study conjectures that 
strong IP arrangements improve the information environment of the capital markets 
facilitating the use of FFI in investment decisions in these capital markets. Thus investors 
capitalize FFI in making investment decisions resulting in low levels of SPS. 
The above proposition is tested by directly investigating the association of FFI with SPS and 
the complementing effects IP on the use of FFI in the capital markets. We use the same 40 
countries of MYY for a sample period from 1995-2010. We follow MYY’s proposed 
measures of SPS (Com and R2), and also propose a new measure (SYNCH), which is the first 
principal component of MYY’ measures.  
We use two distinct proxies for FFI. The first proxy of FFI is taken from Ashbaugh et al. 
(2006) while the second proxy represents accounting based accruals called accounting 
accruals information (AAI).11 For the complementing effects of IP, the IP variables are the 
same as used in the first stage of the study. 
For the first proxy of FFI, we find that only volatility of ROA has a negative and statistically 
significant association with the SPS measures. We do not find any significant association for 
the interaction of IP and FFI with SPS. However, IP show a consistent negative and 
statistically significant association with SPS. For the second FFI proxy, we again do not find 
                                                 
11 We use reporting of loss, standard deviation of ROA and standard deviation of sales from Ashbaugh et al. 
(2006) as a first proxy of FFI. 
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any direct association between SPS and AAI. However, the interaction of IP and AAI shows a 
negative and statistically significant association with SPS. The interaction of IP with FFI is 
based on the assumption that investors rely on FFI in countries with good IP practices.  
These results imply that investors perceive accruals as information signals and rely on it in 
making investment decision. However, this association is dependent on the quality of IP 
arrangements of the countries; i.e., accruals provide information in countries with strong IP 
arrangements. These results are consistent with the view that countries with strong property 
rights have high quality FFI resulting in low earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). These 
results suggest that investors perceive accruals as information signals to the market when 
making their investment decision in countries with strong IP (Ali et al., 2000).  
Overall, these results suggest that IP is a strong and consistent determinant of the use of the 
FFI in capital markets around the world. IP arrangements are likely to increase the quality of 
firm-specific information. Thus, investors capitalize such information in share prices leading 
to informed arbitrage, which reduces SPS. 
The results of this study need to be read within the wider context of cross-country studies of 
accounting, finance and economics. With many factors involved in stock market development 
and different countries having different economic and regulatory histories, it is difficult to 
conclude that investors price FFI in the same manner in each country. The differences in the 
IP leads to differences in the quality of financial information reported to outsiders. As Leuz 
(2010) puts it, reporting practices are unlikely to converge globally, despite widespread IFRS 
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adoption due to variations in institutional environments. Thus investors rely on the relevant 
set of FFI in making investment decisions.  
In spite of these caveats, we believe that this study sheds light into the complex relation 
between synchronicity, accounting-based firm fundamentals, and country-level institutional 
arrangements. These findings highlight an important link between IP and reporting of quality 
accounting information to outsiders, and complement the international accounting literature 
that documents systematic patterns in the relation between stock returns and FFI. Further 
investigation into intra-country association of FFI and other sources of information is left to 
future research studies.  
This paper has its limitations. The first limitation arises from the difficulty in identifying the 
IP measure. There are many facets of the development of a stock market (Wulandari & 
Rahman, 2004). Many countries in our sample had their unique experiences in developing 
their stock markets.  The IP variable we use only broadly captures the state and level of market 
development of the sample countries. Furthermore, our IP variable is based on underlying 
variables that have ordinal scale properties, not ratio scale properties.  
Second, there is a variety of other information sources other than accounting based firm 
fundamentals and other institutional arrangements present across the world with each having 
its impact on SPS. For example, studies (Chen, Roll, & Ross, 1986; Kilian & Park, 2009; 
Fama, 1981) suggest that macrocosmic news such as such as oil price shocks, inflation, and 
interest rates, affect share price returns and thus may affect SPS.  
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Third, the paper is limited to the use of country-level IP arrangements. There is no universally 
accepted IP index such as index developed on the basis of independence of the board of 
directors, audit committees, repute of external auditors etc. at the firm level which could be 
used across the study.  
Lastly, the study uses total accruals as a proxy for FFI.  Total accruals is a crude measure. The 
use of a more direct sophisticated measure of accruals such as abnormal accruals or 
components of accruals may give more robust results. However, due to data constraints such 
sophisticated measures could not be used for the purposes of this study. 
There are several issues for future research. One issue is a more in-depth comparative analyses 
of the developed and developing countries with respect to IP environments at the firm-level 
in each country such as investigating the effects of board of directors, audit committees, and 
Big-4 auditors on SPS. Second, the effects of major corporate collapses or financial crises on 
SPS could be studied. Third, since the results of this paper suggest that macroeconomic 
indicators affect SPS, further investigation of the macroeconomic variable such as inflation, 
oil prices, the level of debt, and trade openness could be beneficial. Fourth, this study is only 
limited to the use of a few accounting based FFI items; an investigation of SPS with other FFI 
could be informative at the firm and country level. Fifth, this paper uses total accruals as an 
information signal; however, others may wish to investigate finer measures of earnings quality 
when the data are more readily available. Sixth, the relation of the timeliness and accounting 
conservatism with SPS could be an issue for future research. Ball et al. (2000) argue that 
conservatism facilitates monitoring of managers. 
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